Titlebook: Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy; Jari Kaukua,Tomas Ekenberg Book 2016 Springer International Publishing

Genetics

Augustine on Second-Order Desires and Persons,ontext, little discussion about their respective accounts of personhood. According to Frankfurt, a person is a being capable of forming a certain kind of second-order desires, namely, second-order volitions. In this paper I use Frankfurt’s account of desire and the will to elucidate Augustine’s conc

Acclaim

The Augustinian , and Materialist Theories of Mind,t of substantial scholarly attention. However, what has received less attention is that Augustine, like Descartes, also employs .-style reasoning to ascertain the nature of the mind and to argue against materialist theories of mind. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s central argument to this end i

innovation

membrane

Avicenna on Non-conceptual Content and Self-Awareness in Non-human Animals,an issue that is still a matter of discussion in contemporary philosophy of mind: whether non-human animals have consciousness and intentional states that constitute a structured experience of their relation to the world, even though they do not have conceptual knowledge. This paper provides an expl

可行

wangle

,: Awareness and Choice in the Constitution of the Self,: Augustine’s concept of endogenous attention, Avicenna’s concept of primitive self-awareness, and Olivi’s concept of reflexivity as a necessary feature of personhood. It is Descartes who by his rejection of a distinction between a substance and its principal attribute and his weaving together of th

GILD

Aping Logic? Albert the Great on Animal Mind and Action,s, especially primates, have the ability to grasp the material world in a meaningful, i.e., intentional way and display complex types of behaviour that makes it plausible to assume that they have inferential capacities. The physiological similarities between many animal species and human beings allo

哀悼

The Reflexivity of Incorporeal Acts as Source of Freedom and Subjectivity in Aquinas,of the phenomena associated with subjectivity. I propose that in his theory of reflexivity as a metaphysical property of incorporeal beings and the necessary condition for self-awareness and free judgment, we can find his efforts to accommodate the experience of the human being as self or subject. T

amplitude

Dri727

Self-Awareness and Perception in Augustinian Epistemology,lf, meaning that it has an unmediated access to its essence; secondly, that medieval . retained this unmediated access to the essence of the soul by itself, thus opting for a view alternative to authors of an Aristotelian hue for whom the soul knows itself only by means of knowing its acts. In the f