Titlebook: Social Choice Re-Examined; Kenneth J. Arrow (Professor),Amartya Sen (Professo Book 1996 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publis

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Discussion of Hammond’s Paperod of modelling rights using social choice rules has been criticized and game forms have been suggested as a superior alternative, Hammond’s construct has the advantage of including both the traditional social choice models and game forms as special cases. I will argue below that this is not enough.

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On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issuesis path-breaking contribution, Sen (1970a, 1970b) introduced the first formal formulation of individual rights in social choice theory. Since then, several writers have raised critical questions regarding the appropriateness of this formulation and have explored alternative approaches: see Nozick (1

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Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principlese social evaluations. Most principles that produce . of alternative states employ social value functions of those utilities to generate social preferences.. The most commonly used principles are ., whose value function is the simple sum of utilities, and ., whose value function is average utility. O

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Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choicein fact, that there is no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility’ (Arrow, 1963, p. 9). It deserves emphasis that the reason underlying his insistence on ordinal as well as interpersonally non-comparable utilities is ‘the application of Leibniz’s principle

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Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functionsf students to colleges should take into account the interests of those who are seeking education. All of the above are examples of situations in which knowing the preferences of agents is necessary to determine what is collectively best.