书目名称 | Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition | 编辑 | Hamid Taieb | 视频video | | 概述 | Presents a unique historical study on intentionality’s relational nature.Provides an unprecedented analysis of the historical discussions on intentionality, causality and reference.Gives a novel accou | 丛书名称 | Primary Sources in Phenomenology | 图书封面 |  | 描述 | .This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano’s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any..The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the th | 出版日期 | Book 2018 | 关键词 | Brentano on intentionality; Intentionality and relations; Relation to objects; Intentional objects; Psyc | 版次 | 1 | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0 | isbn_ebook | 978-3-319-98887-0Series ISSN 0924-1965 | issn_series | 0924-1965 | copyright | Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 |
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