Titlebook: Mathematics and Politics; Strategy, Voting, Po Alan D. Taylor,Allison M. Pacelli Textbook 2008Latest edition Springer-Verlag New York 2008

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77645-3Mathematics; political power; political science; politics; social choice; strategy

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,Yes–No Voting, with quite a different voting situation—the one in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. In theses systems each voter responds with a vote of “yea” or “nay.” A . is simply a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes

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Conflict,e influenced by those of another. Real-world examples of such conflict situations tend to be enormously complex, and a considerable amount of influential work in political science deals with the analysis of particular conflict situations and the ramifications of literally dozens of subtle influences

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Fairness,ssue, and is very difficult to define or quantify. Surprisingly, however, a mathematical perspective can help identify what it means for a solution to be fair and offer a variety methods or procedures for achieving a solution in many types of disputes..Another common type of dispute involves fairly

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Escalation,s race of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, to mention just two. Such escalatory behavior is driven at least in part by a desire to keep previous investments from having been wasted. In this chapter we consider a model of escalatory behavior introduced by the economist Martin Shubik and extensively analy

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,More Yes–No Voting,ter 2 that characterized the weighted voting systems as precisely those that are trade robust (meaning that an arbitrary trade among several winning coalitions can never simultaneously render all of them losing). A natural question suggested by this result is whether trade robustness really needs to