Titlebook: Keeping the World in Mind; Mental Representatio Anne Jaap Jacobson Book 2013 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Introduction,esentations, as commonly understood in standard Anglophone philosophy today, can seem unproblematic. The inference from ‘Mary believes that her keys are on the table,’ to ‘Mary has a state with the content, “My keys are on the table,”‘ may look obvious.

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Aristotelian Representations II,so involves looking not just at actual cases, but also considering the changes we need to make more generally in interpretative expectations. For example, we want to think about at least a range of cognitive successes as not involving content, aboutness or truth. For contemporary thinkers, that may

Heterodoxy

Hume,ion and the other is by example. These distinct methods correspond, as we have seen, to two different theses about the mind’s relation to the environment. On each account theorists talk about representations,but the two are of very different kinds. One sort of representation, coming from language as

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Concepts, semantic content. According to the resultant theory, the mind’s states can be understood not as about the world, but rather as absorbing the world. As we have discussed, this alternative model originates with Aristotle, and varies with theorists and their ontologies.

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Actions, Emotions and Beliefs, Part I,s going on today in building a science of the mind. To be sure, there may be heuristic reasons to talk about what a neural signal is saying or to regard a burst of neural activity as about some episode in the environment. Nonetheless, such talk has a price to pay to be legitimate in a science of the

Tincture

Actions, Emotions and Beliefs, Part II,tations provide the propositional attitudes that are our reasons for acting. In such an account, there is often an implicit appeal to a Davidsonian conception (Davidson, 2001; Schlosser, 2011). Reasons for action consist of a belief and desire (in some very general sense of those words) that cause t

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