Titlebook: Introduction to Game Theory; Stef Tijs Book 2003 Hindustan Book Agency (India) 2003

秘密会议

Mixed extensions of bimatrix games,The . (., .) is given by (Δ., Δ., ., .) where ..

fibroblast

The Nash equilibria of a 3-person game,We consider 3-person games, where each player has a finite number of pure actions: players 1, 2 and 3 have respectively ., . and . pure actions. The payoffs can be described by three 3-dimensional matrices..

防水

不近人情

Potential games,These games are studied in D. Monderer and L.S. Shapley (1996). See also Voorneveld (1999). Let Γ = 〈., .,…, ., ., .,…, .〉 be a .-person game and let .: Π. . → ℝ be a real-valued function on the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces of Γ. Then . is called a . of Γ if for each . ∈ {1, 2,…, .}, each . ∈ Π.X. and all ., . ∈ . we have ..

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争吵

PURG

Dominance, the ,-core and stable sets,Let 〈., .〉 be an .-person game. Let ., . ∈ .(.), . ∈ 2.{φ}. We say that ., denoted by . dom. ., if

敬礼

反应

NTU-games,An NTU-. is a pair 〈., .〉 where . = {1, 2,…, .} and where . is a map assigning to each . ∈ 2.{φ} a subset .(.) of ℝ. such that the following properties hold for each .:

indecipherable

The NTU-value,Let 〈., .〉 be an NTU-game. A (.) vector λ ∈ Δ := {. ∈ ℝ. | Σ. µ. = 1} is called . if for all . ∈ 2.{φ}: