Titlebook: Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities; Monetary Policy and Robert Franzese,Peter Mooslechner,Martin Schürz Book 2004 Springer-Verl

组装

jaunty

Interest Groups, Enlargement of the EMU and Labor Market Reform, interest groups they seek to push governments toward policies that are advantageous to their members. We find that as labor unions can more easily influence governments’ policy decisions, fewer labor market reforms will be implemented, which in turn raises unemployment and inflation, while leaving

厌烦

兽群

荒唐

The European Central Bank,cess by which its members are appointed. In May 1998, the European Union decided who was to be in and out of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The ins subsequently decided who will run the ECB. Who influences the appointment process, and what does the process imply for monetary policy? This chapter

Compatriot

,Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Central Bank? Union-Firm-Central Bank Interactions and Inflation in a Meby the probability of bankruptcy and exit affects expected wages and employment. Our results are counterintuitive: we find that conservative CBs strengthen wage claims. We also discuss the case of the formation of a monetary union. We find that wage demands are increasing in the number of member st

strdulate

Barter

多山

portant theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant conclusion that emerges from .Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities. is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-term real effects, even in equilibrium models with fully rational expectations. .978-1-4419-5380-3978-1-4757-4062-2