Titlebook: Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability; Immanuel M. Bomze,Benedikt M. Pötscher Book 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Book 1989Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Strategies and payoffs 5 2. 1. A general setting for evolutionary game theory 6 2. 2. Mixed strategies and population games 8 2. 3. Finite number of strategies . . . . . 13 2. 4. Infinitely many (pure) strategies 15 2. 5. Structured populations: asymmetric contests and

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Introduction,y over time whereas others do not? These questions are central in the theory of biological evolution. The concept of evolutionary stability introduced in [. 1973] and [. 1974] provides a framework allowing for a formal analysis of these and related problems. (Forerunners of the idea of evolutionary

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Global invasion barriers,nd . [1985] use the terms “uninvadable” and “evolutionary stable” synonymously). According to our definition in Section 4.1, a state is uninvadable if it is protected by a positive . invasion barrier. As it turns out, this concept guarantees stability in dynamical models for the time evolution of di

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Games with bilinear average mean payoff,idered in the literature, see e.g. [. 1974], [. 1977], [. 1978], [. et al., 1979], [. 1980 and 1981]. Section 5.1 contains a characterization of such models. It is shown that these models are essentially evolutionary games consisting of pairwise conflicts. Some of the results in Chapters 3 and 4 are

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Mixed strategies, and . ∈ .. As a consequence, the average mean payoff is given by .(.)=x¯.′.(.), and the score functions take the form ..(ε) = (.¯.—.¯.)′.(..(.)), for ., . ∈ .. Here .: .→ℝ. maps a distribution . to the vector .(.) of mean payoffs to the pure strategies against members of a population in state .. Us

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Jürgen Boelcke,Bernard Straub,Paul Thielebusiness or mission values. Emergent app- cation requirements create a need for ambiguity tolerance. Systems of systems and global development create needs for 978-3-540-31112-6978-3-540-32450-8Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349