Titlebook: Engineering Secure Software and Systems; Second International Fabio Massacci,Dan Wallach,Nicola Zannone Conference proceedings 2010 Springe

学术讨论会

Subjectivism, Freedom, and Social-Interest protocols is very difficult and error-prone and most tool-based verification approaches only consider standard security properties such as secrecy or authenticity. In our opinion, application-specific security properties give better guarantees. In this paper we illustrate how to verify properties t

纠缠

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-4145-1idespread. In these dynamic environments the code that is going to be executed is not known at compile-time, and often not even at application start-up, neither by the application producer nor by the user. This turns reliable, well designed software into a dangerous and potentially malicious softwar

minimal

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15871-3messages caused by SQL injection from revealing sensitive information. The goal of this research is to assess the relative effectiveness of unit and system level testing of web applications to reveal both error message information leak and SQL injection vulnerabilities. To produce 100% test coverage

Conflagration

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07984-1between visualization and security: when the application data is protected by an access control policy, the GUI should be aware of this and respect the policy. For example, the GUI should not display options to users for actions that they are not authorized to execute on application data. Taking thi

中止

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59298-4me pressure. This paper describes how we have addressed this problem by using a collection of modular safeguards, which are tailored to the application domain. These safeguards, which are specific but still fairly atomic, are combined into requirement profiles that seamlessly integrate into the over

花争吵

Malleable

Fabio Massacci,Dan Wallach,Nicola ZannoneFast track conference proceeding.Unique visibility.State of the art research

Obstacle

Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/310939.jpg

Omnipotent

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11747-3Java; calculus; model checking; program rewriting; security architecture; security assurance; security mea

Decongestant

978-3-642-11746-6Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010