书目名称 | Emotions as Original Existences | 副标题 | A Theory of Emotion, | 编辑 | Demian Whiting | 视频video | | 概述 | Defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what David Hume referred to as ‘original existences’.Advances the idea that emotions serve as the categorical bases for our behavioral dispositions, in | 图书封面 |  | 描述 | .This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as ‘original existences’: feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion is key to a proper understanding of human motivation and the self. Whiting establishes that emotions as types of bodily feelings serve as the categorical bases for our behavioural dispositions, including those associated with moral thought, virtue, and vice..The book concludes by advancing the idea that emotions make up our intrinsic nature - the characterisation of what we are like in and of ourselves, when considered apart from how we are disposed to behave. The conclusion additionally draws out the implications of the claims made throughout the book in relation to our understanding of mental illness and the treatment of emotional disorders.. | 出版日期 | Book 2020 | 关键词 | original existences; hume; representation; intentionality; consciousness; behavioural dispositions; desire | 版次 | 1 | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54682-3 | isbn_softcover | 978-3-030-54684-7 | isbn_ebook | 978-3-030-54682-3 | copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl |
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