Titlebook: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2013; 15th International W Guido Bertoni,Jean-Sébastien Coron Conference proceedings 20

NOVA

争吵加

Conference proceedings 2013wing topical sections: side-channel attacks; physical unclonable function; lightweight cryptography; hardware implementations and fault attacks; efficient and secure implementations; elliptic curve cryptography; masking; side-channel attacks and countermeasures.

Blasphemy

Zhiwei Cen,Yoshimasa Aoki,Junko Doig around 2. faults and performing 2. computations on an average, it is possible to recover the entire internal state of MICKEY at the beginning of the key-stream generation phase. We further consider the scenario where the fault may affect at most three neighbouring bits and in that case we require around 2. faults on an average.

身体萌芽

persistence

A Differential Fault Attack on MICKEY 2.0g around 2. faults and performing 2. computations on an average, it is possible to recover the entire internal state of MICKEY at the beginning of the key-stream generation phase. We further consider the scenario where the fault may affect at most three neighbouring bits and in that case we require around 2. faults on an average.

anachronistic

INERT

0302-9743 hannel attacks; physical unclonable function; lightweight cryptography; hardware implementations and fault attacks; efficient and secure implementations; elliptic curve cryptography; masking; side-channel attacks and countermeasures.978-3-642-40348-4978-3-642-40349-1Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

Strength

帐单

Saravanan Gujula Mohan,R. Ganeshof independent interest, we show how to use our evaluation results to significantly improve the performance of the recently proposed TARDIS scheme, which is based on remanence decay in SRAM and used as a time-keeping mechanism for low-power clock-less devices.

nocturia

Zhiwei Cen,Yoshimasa Aoki,Junko Doias a power consumption of 12.5 .W at 1 MHz on a low leakage 130 nm CMOS process technology. As a result, we provide a design that needs 40% less resources than related work. Our design is even smaller than the smallest SHA-1 and SHA-2 implementations.