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Titlebook: Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models; Jaeyoung Sung Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under

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发表于 2025-3-21 17:26:56 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
书目名称Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models
编辑Jaeyoung Sung
视频video
概述Provides economics-oriented presentations of continuous-time contracting models.Serves as a bridge between the two strands of existing textbooks on discrete- and continuous-time contracting models.Wri
图书封面Titlebook: Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models;  Jaeyoung Sung Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under
描述.This book provides a self-contained introduction to discrete-time and continuous-time models in contracting theory to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics and finance and researchers focusing on closed-form solutions and their economic implications. Discrete-time models are introduced to highlight important elements in both economics and mathematics of contracting problems and to serve as a bridge for continuous-time models and their applications. The book serves as a bridge between the currently two almost separate strands of textbooks on discrete- and continuous-time contracting models..This book is written in a manner that makes complex mathematical concepts more accessible to economists. However, it would also be an invaluable tool for applied mathematicians who are looking to learn about possible economic applications of various control methods..
出版日期Textbook 2023
关键词Discrete-time Contracting; Mathematical Structures of Contracting Problems; Adverse Selection and Mora
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5487-2
isbn_softcover978-981-99-5489-6
isbn_ebook978-981-99-5487-2
copyrightThe Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapor
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发表于 2025-3-22 00:14:46 | 显示全部楼层
Information Asymmetry: Hidden Informationlow) risk firms can appear to overreact (underreact) to hidden news about the quality of project opportunities because they optimally invest more (less) aggressively to good news and more (less) conservatively to bad news than they would do were the news and their project decisions to be public.
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Markus Rabe,Sven Spiekermann,Sigrid Wenzelamming method to obtain closed-form solutions to the two interesting cases: namely, a stationary case, and a linear-quadratic case. The former and the latter cases help characterize, respectively, static and dynamic aspects of optimal contracts.
发表于 2025-3-22 12:27:44 | 显示全部楼层
Techniken der Verifikation und Validierung, outcome risk, but also the (unconditional) drift risk. However, if the principal is risk neutral, she takes all alone the drift risk, and the sensitivity of the contract remains unchanged from that of the Holmström–Milgrom case. The second case confirms the same conclusion for the risk-neutral principal.
发表于 2025-3-22 16:32:26 | 显示全部楼层
Markus Rabe,Sven Spiekermann,Sigrid Wenzel career concerns than old people do, then their aggregate incentives are the same across all people, and as a result, current contracts for young people provide lower-powered explicit incentives than those for old people do.
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Contracting Under Incomplete Information outcome risk, but also the (unconditional) drift risk. However, if the principal is risk neutral, she takes all alone the drift risk, and the sensitivity of the contract remains unchanged from that of the Holmström–Milgrom case. The second case confirms the same conclusion for the risk-neutral principal.
发表于 2025-3-23 06:05:26 | 显示全部楼层
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