Titlebook: Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources; Rüdiger Pethig Conference proceedings 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelb

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6987-3ta) are discussed with a linear payment schedule. While for the normal—distribution (LEN—model) the solution can be given explicitly the case of the beta—distribution only allows for a numerical solution.

Chemotherapy

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Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitmentmbership in teams. Finally, the social costs of allocating resources to a conflict become greater when the team size is less than half of the number of contenders, compared to the same conflict without strategic team formation.

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CEDE

Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions emissions affect the climate through cumulative emissions. In a dynamic game of CO. emissions, it is shown that the tax giving a Pareto optimal solution is the same for the open loop and the Markov perfect equilibrium, in spite of the fact that these two equilibria differ in the absence of a CO. tax.

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Editor’s Introductionwaste products stemming from the processes of production and consumption. In the absence of exclusive property rights and markets, conflicts over competing uses are unavoidable. In the Pigouvian tradition the remedy called for is a tax—subsidy scheme to “internalise” externalities. From this perspec

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Coronary-Spasm

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