Titlebook: Classification, Disease and Evidence; New Essays in the Ph Philippe Huneman,Gérard Lambert,Marc Silberstein Book 2015 Springer Science+Busi

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The Naturalization of the Concept of Disease,ving most of them a technical meaning based on an explanatory model. This transformation of the meaning of the term is an essential part of its .. Debating on the definition of ‘disease’, what most philosophers of medicine have examined is the pre-naturalized meaning of the term: for that reason the

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The Function Debate and the Concept of Mental Disorder,hat they offer to resolve conceptual difficulties in psychiatry. I demonstrate that their respective positions are ambiguous: the solutions they propose waver between two opposite points of view. The one is a denunciation of the psychiatric discourse from the perspective of what it . be; the other i

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Defining Genetic Disease, to the use of the term “cause”. Moreover, genes alone cannot explain the development of a disease; environmental causes are also at play. So when is giving primary importance to genetic causation justified?.In his paper “The Concept of Genetic Disease” (2004), David Magnus differentiates three comp

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Causal and Probabilistic Inferences in Diagnostic Reasoning: Historical Insight into the Contemporaical diagnostic practice. It is then shown that diagnostic and causal reasoning has been closely associated throughout the history of rational medicine in a relationship that may be seen as consubstantial, or even central to the very foundations of rational medicine. This relationship both explains

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