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Titlebook: Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets; Proceedings of the F Reinhard Tietz,Wulf Albers,Reinhard Selten Conference pro

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Astrophysics and Space Science Libraryties are compared. Rational expectations models are tested and the structure of forecasts are studied. In general the rational expectations models capture much of what is observed but paradoxes exist in the data and in the application of the models.
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Experimental Economics: Ways to Model Bounded Rational Bargaining Behavior resolution were isolated and new descriptive theories were developed by the explorative method. Some theses regarding what should be taken into consideration in modeling bounded rational behavior are given.
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Modeling Mediator Behavior in Experimental Gamesct to predict mediator strategy. In Experiment 1, the model was supported; in Experiment 2, derivative hypotheses were tested about the effects of mediator strategy on bargainer concessions. These hypotheses, which also were supported, suggest that mediator strategies are critical strategic factors in bargaining.
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Learning in Common Value Auctionst repeat itself. Data from a series of common value auction market experiments indicates that the second of these two learning processes characterizes behavior in these markets as bidders adjust to the “winner’s curse”.
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