Titlebook: Advances in Dynamic Games; Theory, Applications Pierre Cardaliaguet,Ross Cressman Book 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 H

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Kerstin Stolzenberg,Krischan Heberleresource individuals live and interact during seasons of fixed lengths separated by winter periods. All individuals die at the end of the season and the size of the next generation is determined by the the consumer–resource interaction which took place during the season. Resource individuals are ass

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-61895-0pley value operator is chosen as the cooperative optimality principle. It is shown that components of Shapley value are absolutely continuous and, thus, differentiable functions along any admissible trajectory. The main result consists in the fact that if in any subgame along the cooperative traject

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Kerstin Stolzenberg,Krischan Heberletion that the unconstrained penalized games have open loop Nash equilibria we give conditions on our model to ensure that there exists a subsequence of penalty parameters converging to infinity for which the corresponding sequence of solutions to the penalized games converges to an open loop Nash eq

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Kerstin Stolzenberg,Krischan Heberlepayoff functions of a noncooperative game played by the steady-state values of the input signals. To achieve locally stable convergence to the resulting steady-state Nash equilibria, we introduce a non-model-based approach, where the players determine their actions based only on their own payoff val

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