Titlebook: Weapons without a Cause; The Politics of Weap Theo Farrell Book 1997 Theo Farrell 1997 budget.development.Institution.politics.production.s

STELL

Theo Farrell and objects of study, they are assumed to emerge in a rational process of cognitive division. Ronald Akers (1992:4), for example, distinguishes between disciplines (bodies of knowledge with their own perspectives) and specialities (areas of study) on this basis. In this chapter we re-consider the i

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美学

泰然自若

Theo Farrellonsidering the sustained importance and the pivotal role of the discourse in other Muslim contexts analyzed in this book, I will argue that the Turkish literature on the . appears relatively recent, abstract, academic, and, more significantly, antireformist. This stands in stark contrast to the conv

Trigger-Point

ersity. It soon became obvious that the illness was a hitherto unknown infectious disease. The number of afflicted patients increased to 23. Several cases were observed in Frankfurt/Main at the same time and, some weeks later also in Belgrade, Yugo­ slavia. Common to all the patients was previous co

boisterous

Strategic Issues, rationales for the MX and B-2. First, was it meant to serve as a symbol of national resolve, to ward off enemies and reassure allies? Second, was it needed as a bargaining chip to wring concessions out of the Soviets in arms negotiations?

Foam-Cells

Strategic Issues, rationales for the MX and B-2. First, was it meant to serve as a symbol of national resolve, to ward off enemies and reassure allies? Second, was it needed as a bargaining chip to wring concessions out of the Soviets in arms negotiations?

hauteur

Institutional Issues,on without having genuine strategic reasons to justify their actions. The services gain tremendous influence by being permanent actors in this policy area, whereas political appointees come and go, and by controlling the detail of weapons development. Presidents are far less involved in weapon acqui

stroke

Institutional Issues,on without having genuine strategic reasons to justify their actions. The services gain tremendous influence by being permanent actors in this policy area, whereas political appointees come and go, and by controlling the detail of weapons development. Presidents are far less involved in weapon acqui