IOTA
发表于 2025-3-28 15:55:35
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成份
发表于 2025-3-28 19:55:21
On Strategy-Proof Allocation without Payments or Priorsy of an agent is additive. The social welfare of a mechanism is defined as the overall utility of all agents. This model is first defined by Guo and Conitzer . Here we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that have a good ., that is, those that are able to achieve social welfare close to t
两种语言
发表于 2025-3-29 00:23:05
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Repetitions
发表于 2025-3-29 05:06:27
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GRIEF
发表于 2025-3-29 09:57:10
A General Framework for Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Compact Games] gave a sufficient condition for the tractability of this problem; however, this condition only applies to a subset of existing representations. We propose a different algorithmic approach for the optimal CE problem that applies to . compact representations, and give a sufficient condition that gen
山羊
发表于 2025-3-29 14:13:25
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headlong
发表于 2025-3-29 18:34:19
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Urea508
发表于 2025-3-29 23:05:54
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deviate
发表于 2025-3-30 03:24:02
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箴言
发表于 2025-3-30 07:42:05
Internet and Network Economics978-3-642-25510-6Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349