Traumatic-Grief 发表于 2025-3-26 21:21:34
Optimal Pricing in Social Networks with Incomplete Informationuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete information case where agents know a common distribution about others’ private valuations, and make decisions simultaneously. The “rational behavior” of agents in this case is captured by the well-known Bayesian Nash脆弱么 发表于 2025-3-27 03:44:48
http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472427/472427_32.pngcommensurate 发表于 2025-3-27 06:07:56
http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472427/472427_33.png歌唱队 发表于 2025-3-27 10:25:30
A Global Characterization of Envy-Free Truthful Scheduling of Two Tasksstigate the allocation functions that are both weakly monotone (truthful) and locally efficient (envy-free), in the case of only two tasks, but . players. We show that the only allocation functions that satisfy both conditions are affine minimizers, with strong restrictions on the parameters of theOintment 发表于 2025-3-27 15:13:27
Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricingof valuations for which one can design such auctions. Surprisingly, we also show that minor modifications to these valuations lead to impossibility results, the most surprising of which is that for a natural class of valuations, one cannot achieve efficiency, truthfulness, envy freeness, individual价值在贬值 发表于 2025-3-27 18:54:42
Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctionshe optimality of the second price auction with monopoly reserves when the bidders’ values are drawn i.i.d. from regular distributions , and its approximate optimality when they are drawn from independent regular distributions , we focus our attention to the second price auction with general有助于 发表于 2025-3-27 22:24:39
http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472427/472427_37.png性行为放纵者 发表于 2025-3-28 05:25:59
http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472427/472427_38.pngtolerance 发表于 2025-3-28 06:46:23
http://reply.papertrans.cn/48/4725/472427/472427_39.png关节炎 发表于 2025-3-28 14:30:47
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