Infect
发表于 2025-3-25 05:34:15
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Indicative
发表于 2025-3-25 11:10:03
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Ingest
发表于 2025-3-25 13:21:32
Nikhil Devanur,Jason Hartline,Anna Karlin,Thach Nguyenthe Kyoto School, specifying its inception in the pre-war period under the influence of Kitaro Nishida and Hajime Tanabe and its post-war maturation. This anthropology was developed in Japan through an actively critical re-reading of Heidegger, in the course of Nishida’s and Tanabe’s philosophies an
外面
发表于 2025-3-25 18:36:20
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聋子
发表于 2025-3-25 21:43:52
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nonsensical
发表于 2025-3-26 02:51:35
Mingyu Guo,Victor Naroditskiy,Vincent Conitzer,Amy Greenwald,Nicholas R. Jenningss contemporaries. These thinkers bring to ontology very different perspectives than those of conventional metaphysics. Equally versed in psychiatry, religion, metaphysics, the mystical traditions of the East and the West, and the human sciences in general, Jung was one of the most interesting and ve
inspired
发表于 2025-3-26 06:22:11
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大骂
发表于 2025-3-26 10:09:43
Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resourcesnder, who must allocate her resources to defend potential targets, and an attacker, who chooses a target to attack. Existing work has assumed the set of defender’s resources to be fixed. This assumption precludes the effective use of approximation algorithms, since a slight change in the defender’s
Biomarker
发表于 2025-3-26 14:24:26
On Allocations with Negative Externalitiesy a social network. Furthermore, the utility of a buyer is a decreasing function of the number of neighbors who do not own the item. In other words, they exhibit negative externalities, deriving utility from being . in their purchases. In this model, any fixed setting of the price induces a sub-game
HPA533
发表于 2025-3-26 16:56:46
An Improved 2-Agent Kidney Exchange Mechanismge programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to the maximum cardinality matching. This is an improvement over a recent upper bound of 2 and, furthermore, our mechanism beats