Defiance
发表于 2025-3-28 15:30:32
Selfishness Level of Strategic Games,al interests and the impact of their decisions on the society as a whole. Our analysis reveals that the selfishness level often provides more refined insights into the game than other measures of inefficiency, such as the price of stability or the price of anarchy.
aristocracy
发表于 2025-3-28 20:17:18
Approximating the Minmax Value of Three-Player Games within a Constant is as Hard as Detecting Planh may be seen as a derandomisation of the former, may be used to argue for hardness of approximating the minmax value based on a hardness assumption about . algorithms. Our technique for derandomisation is general enough to also apply to related work about .-Nash equilibria.
注入
发表于 2025-3-29 00:03:54
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光滑
发表于 2025-3-29 05:34:12
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消灭
发表于 2025-3-29 11:10:45
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NAV
发表于 2025-3-29 13:23:22
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新奇
发表于 2025-3-29 17:26:57
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PAC
发表于 2025-3-29 19:46:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39683-4tegy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most . less than a best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.
Introduction
发表于 2025-3-30 00:01:12
Der Aufbau der Zweistofflegierungenilibrium is .-complete. Our positive results state that congestion games with capacities are potential games in the well studied singleton case. Polynomial algorithms that compute these equilibria are also provided.
SSRIS
发表于 2025-3-30 06:03:05
Mechanisms for Scheduling with Single-Bit Private Values,ly a single-bit of information..We prove a separation between truthful-in-expectation and universally truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization: We first show how to design an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and then prove lower bounds on the approximation guarantee of universally truthful mechanisms.