Subjugate 发表于 2025-3-28 16:48:09

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改革运动 发表于 2025-3-28 21:16:42

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LOPE 发表于 2025-3-29 01:44:34

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Medicaid 发表于 2025-3-29 04:24:01

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狗窝 发表于 2025-3-29 09:27:17

978-3-662-44802-1Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

蜈蚣 发表于 2025-3-29 15:12:48

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Flawless 发表于 2025-3-29 16:25:49

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26465-2arly interested in the well-known . mechanism. For dichotomous preferences, we first show that truthful, symmetric and optimal mechanisms exist if intractable mechanisms are allowed. We then provide a connection to online bipartite matching. Using this connection, it is possible to design truthful,

神圣将军 发表于 2025-3-29 23:01:20

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冥界三河 发表于 2025-3-30 01:30:01

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cardiopulmonary 发表于 2025-3-30 07:09:48

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26465-2n cut and party affiliation games. Our results improve previous ones by Bhalgat et al. (EC 10) in terms of the obtained approximation guarantee. More importantly, our algorithm identifies a polynomially-long sequence of improvement moves from any initial state to an approximate equilibrium in these
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查看完整版本: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 7th International Sy Ron Lavi Conference proceedings 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 algorithmic mecha