radiograph
发表于 2025-3-27 00:32:08
Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection Threshold Modelsf threshold models. Motivated by the general lack of positive results establishing monotonicity and submodularity of the influence function for threshold models, we introduce a general class of switching-selection threshold models where the switching and selection functions may also depend on the no
轻而薄
发表于 2025-3-27 02:50:10
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Affluence
发表于 2025-3-27 07:35:43
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Keratin
发表于 2025-3-27 13:12:27
Clearing Markets via Bundlesyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the CWE notion introduced by Feldman et al. , we introduce the concept of a . (MC-CWE) as a natural relaxation of the classical Walrasian equilibrium (WE) solution concept. The only difference between a MC-CWE and a WE is the ability for
microscopic
发表于 2025-3-27 17:33:47
Walrasian Equilibrium with Few BuyersThe first class is based on additive capacities or weights, and the second on the influence in a social network. While neither class holds the gross substitutes condition, we show that in both classes the existence of WEQ is guaranteed under certain restrictions, and in particular when there are onl
苦恼
发表于 2025-3-27 21:23:19
Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market Accessa limited number of markets simultaneously. This situation naturally arises if market entry is subject to a valid license and each firm holds a fixed number of licenses only, or, equivalently, if the firms’ short-term assets only suffice to serve up to a certain number of markets. We allow for firm-
做方舟
发表于 2025-3-28 00:24:34
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无情
发表于 2025-3-28 04:12:36
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使腐烂
发表于 2025-3-28 09:11:40
Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamicsthe smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds on the strong price of anarchy, the loss of quality of coalitionally stable outcomes. Our coalitional smoothness framework captures existing results bounding the strong price of anarchy of network design games.
Valves
发表于 2025-3-28 11:38:52
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