perimenopause 发表于 2025-3-25 05:32:47

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_21.png

IRK 发表于 2025-3-25 08:02:04

Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-Sided Matchingarly interested in the well-known . mechanism. For dichotomous preferences, we first show that truthful, symmetric and optimal mechanisms exist if intractable mechanisms are allowed. We then provide a connection to online bipartite matching. Using this connection, it is possible to design truthful,

Monocle 发表于 2025-3-25 15:21:07

Stable Marriage with General Preferences arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization is practically well-motivated, and as we show, encompasses the well studied hard variant of stable marriage where preferences are allowed to have ties and to be incomplete. As a result, we prove that deciding

BILE 发表于 2025-3-25 19:50:39

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_24.png

节省 发表于 2025-3-25 22:30:12

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_25.png

躲债 发表于 2025-3-26 01:27:13

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_26.png

arsenal 发表于 2025-3-26 04:43:49

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_27.png

Merited 发表于 2025-3-26 12:03:27

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_28.png

NATTY 发表于 2025-3-26 15:51:37

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_29.png

极少 发表于 2025-3-26 17:19:10

http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152945/152945_30.png
页: 1 2 [3] 4 5 6 7
查看完整版本: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 7th International Sy Ron Lavi Conference proceedings 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 algorithmic mecha