施魔法
发表于 2025-3-23 13:30:08
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一小块
发表于 2025-3-23 16:08:48
Standard Single-Unit Auctions,ection is devoted to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which states that, under certain assumptions, the four auction formats yield the same expected revenue to the seller. The implications of relaxing each assumption are also shown.
overhaul
发表于 2025-3-23 19:20:43
Combinatorial Auction Models,d (single-round), pricing rule, activity rule, and starting price. Given the wide spectrum of possibilities, in this chapter, we will only focus on analyzing a few of these models in which the first-price rule will be applied.
民间传说
发表于 2025-3-24 00:25:55
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certain
发表于 2025-3-24 04:19:08
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仇恨
发表于 2025-3-24 10:06:40
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reserve
发表于 2025-3-24 12:33:10
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辩论
发表于 2025-3-24 14:54:32
Assigning Multiple Homogeneous Items in a Single Auction,. For example, if an olive oil factory wants to sell part of its stock, it can choose to conduct an auction. The items to be auctioned may be homogeneous (oil bottles of the same size and acidity) or heterogeneous (different sizes and acidities) and may be awarded in a single auction or in different
ellagic-acid
发表于 2025-3-24 20:13:50
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BUCK
发表于 2025-3-25 00:17:19
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