低位的人或事
发表于 2025-3-25 05:35:36
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cinder
发表于 2025-3-25 09:30:06
,Delegation contracts’ observability and collusion,ect equilibrium of a Cournot duopoly game between two firms, where, as in the previous chapter, the choice of output is delegated by each owner to a manager, and the managers’ incentive schemes are observable and renegotiable.
Ceramic
发表于 2025-3-25 13:45:10
Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure,strategic interaction that the principal is involved in. Principals compete between each other to acquire new delegates as they become available, and this competition modifies their relative strategic strength over time.
裙带关系
发表于 2025-3-25 16:07:48
Conclusions,ompensate them through incentive contracts, modifies firms’ strategy space and allows them to attain equilibria that are different from the one which would have been reached were the owners directly playing the product market game.
FUSE
发表于 2025-3-25 20:39:00
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Ankylo-
发表于 2025-3-26 00:20:21
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客观
发表于 2025-3-26 05:22:11
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Fallibility
发表于 2025-3-26 09:53:29
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trigger
发表于 2025-3-26 15:28:17
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施魔法
发表于 2025-3-26 19:21:33
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