草率女
发表于 2025-3-25 03:44:28
From Defaults to Redemption: Mexico, 1821–1890exclusivity over Mexico’s debt. Yet the government refused to have a patron bank and issued a second loan through different underwriters in the following year. That enabled Mexican negotiators to bargain for cheap credit.
Noisome
发表于 2025-3-25 10:14:28
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烦扰
发表于 2025-3-25 13:36:05
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充满装饰
发表于 2025-3-25 19:00:48
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Armory
发表于 2025-3-25 22:58:09
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拍翅
发表于 2025-3-26 02:18:51
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暗语
发表于 2025-3-26 05:08:20
Conclusionfered, but one conclusion holds: The governments acted as independent players, devising their approaches to underwriters based on country-specific payoffs. Whenever they could, high officials took advantage of their relative power over bankers to borrow cheaply.
并排上下
发表于 2025-3-26 11:36:29
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禁止,切断
发表于 2025-3-26 16:43:18
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BLUSH
发表于 2025-3-26 17:25:26
Governments versus Bankers in the Pre-1914 Sovereign Debt Marketnds—and assumed that governments were passive when negotiating borrowing conditions. This chapter addresses the role of governments as independent decision-makers. Governments decided whether to grant exclusivity to a single patron bank or to negotiate with competing banks to reduce borrowing costs.