中世纪
发表于 2025-3-30 11:10:28
Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Designroblems such as social dilemmas. We design a simple mechanism to achieve Pareto efficiency in social dilemmas and then compare the performance of this mechanism with and without second thoughts. First, second thoughts change the payoff structure of the game in favor of cooperation. Second, this mech
漂亮才会豪华
发表于 2025-3-30 14:30:16
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最低点
发表于 2025-3-30 16:41:55
The Role of (Quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibriaently. Given the fundamental nature of this result various extensions have been proposed. In the present paper we prove all results under optimal condition. Namely, we only assume quasi-analyticity rather than analyticity of the basic economic ingredients, and we prove everything based solely on thi
Ruptured-Disk
发表于 2025-3-30 23:08:36
Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibriumr not an equilibrium has been achieved, then the desiderata by which we evaluate mechanisms in these situations need to include more than merely the properties of their equilibria (are the equilibria Pareto optimal; are they in dominant strategies; are they stable; etc.). For the classical public-go
CHAFE
发表于 2025-3-31 04:06:41
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expansive
发表于 2025-3-31 05:20:09
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frozen-shoulder
发表于 2025-3-31 12:09:50
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