Debark
发表于 2025-3-27 00:34:33
Credible Commitment and Credible Threat in Games,edge disadvantageous to the other party. T. C. Schelling, the Nobel Prize winner in economics, defined commitment and threat as: A announces that B’s behaviour will lead to a response from A. If this response is a reward, then the announcement is a commitment; if this response is a penalty, then the
Iatrogenic
发表于 2025-3-27 02:36:26
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灰姑娘
发表于 2025-3-27 08:21:07
Evolution and Stability,ead irrationality and sheep-flock effect, the analysis of individual rationality with game theory is often not in accord with reality. In fact, these non-rational individuals usually cannot correctly make a one-off, optimal choice in their game behaviour. Instead, through simple imitating and learni
拍翅
发表于 2025-3-27 10:41:09
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Pantry
发表于 2025-3-27 15:02:12
Evolution and Stability,non-rational individuals usually cannot correctly make a one-off, optimal choice in their game behaviour. Instead, through simple imitating and learning, they continuously adjust their own behaviour until it eventually reaches optimal utility. This is the evolutionary game.
具体
发表于 2025-3-27 18:53:00
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dagger
发表于 2025-3-27 22:23:08
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PHONE
发表于 2025-3-28 03:42:36
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清晰
发表于 2025-3-28 10:16:37
,Coalitions—Disintegration and Stability, can cause the coalition to break up, or cause cooperation within the coalition to become confrontational, leading to diminished payoffs, and in some situations can even lead to unstable game behaviour.
MEN
发表于 2025-3-28 12:54:21
9楼