憎恶
发表于 2025-3-28 15:25:40
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有节制
发表于 2025-3-28 21:10:17
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META
发表于 2025-3-29 02:43:58
Die Statistik in der Vergangenheit]..In this chapter we consider two-person . repeated games and formulate Folk theorems both for subgame perfect and for Nash equilibrium. The approach is somewhat informal, and mainly based on examples. In Sect. 7.1 we consider subgame perfect equilibrium and in Sect. 7.2 we consider Nash equilibrium.
雇佣兵
发表于 2025-3-29 04:30:38
Physikalische krankmachende Faktoren (Folge)ation as in Problem 9.13..In this chapter a few other cooperative game theory models are discussed: bargaining problems in Sect. 10.1, exchange economies in Sect. 10.2, matching problems in Sect. 10.3, and house exchange in Sect. 10.4.
Regurgitation
发表于 2025-3-29 09:19:28
Finite Two-Person Gamespt of strict domination to facilitate computation of Nash equilibria and to compute equilibria also of larger games. The structure of this chapter thus parallels the structure of Chap. 2. For a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of finite two-person games see Chap. 13.
capsule
发表于 2025-3-29 13:14:51
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形容词
发表于 2025-3-29 18:14:53
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arboretum
发表于 2025-3-29 22:53:55
Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Gamesd in Sect. 1.3.1 belong to this class..In Sect. 2.1 the basic definitions and theory are discussed. Section 2.2 shows how to solve 2 × . and . × 2 games, and larger games by elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
物质
发表于 2025-3-30 02:12:44
Matrix Games 12.1 presents a proof of the Minimax Theorem, and Sect. 12.2 shows how a matrix game can be solved – optimal strategies and the value of the game can be found – by solving an associated linear programming problem.
sperse
发表于 2025-3-30 07:27:52
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