adduction
发表于 2025-3-23 12:32:04
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含沙射影
发表于 2025-3-23 15:09:53
Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Muñoz-GarciaProvides step-by-step "tools" or "recipes" to help readers solve different classes of games.Focuses on the application of solution concepts to different settings in economics, business, and more.Suppl
Inertia
发表于 2025-3-23 21:36:22
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Mundane
发表于 2025-3-23 23:02:14
Extranasale Allergien und Pseudoallergien,In previous chapters, we considered games that had at least one NE, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Battle of the Sexes, and the Chicken games. But, do all games have at least one NE? If we restrict players to choose a specific strategy with certainty, some games may not have an NE.
insert
发表于 2025-3-24 05:32:31
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火车车轮
发表于 2025-3-24 10:19:46
Juha Punnonen MD, PhD,Jan E. de Vries PhDIn this chapter, we explore a class of signaling games where the sender incurs no costs in sending different messages. Unlike in the previous chapter, where messages were costly, such as acquiring years of education, we now consider ., often known as “cheap talk.
Alienated
发表于 2025-3-24 11:20:50
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点燃
发表于 2025-3-24 15:05:34
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium,In previous chapters, we considered games that had at least one NE, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Battle of the Sexes, and the Chicken games. But, do all games have at least one NE? If we restrict players to choose a specific strategy with certainty, some games may not have an NE.
胆大
发表于 2025-3-24 20:50:37
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,In this chapter, we extend the incomplete information games studied in Chapter 8 to allow for sequential interaction. We also extend the sequential-move games of Chapter 6 to allow for incomplete information, that is, at least one of the players observes some information that her rivals do not observe.
agnostic
发表于 2025-3-25 00:27:57
Cheap Talk Games,In this chapter, we explore a class of signaling games where the sender incurs no costs in sending different messages. Unlike in the previous chapter, where messages were costly, such as acquiring years of education, we now consider ., often known as “cheap talk.