缩短 发表于 2025-3-30 09:31:46

Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection,es including the status quo which results if none of the three proposals is accepted. It is an interesting fact that the set of uniformly perfect equilibrium points depends crucially on cardinal utilities although they always imply the same cyclical majorities. Furthermore, the staus quo will only s

Carminative 发表于 2025-3-30 14:47:01

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比赛用背带 发表于 2025-3-30 17:33:04

Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Partch the antagonistic parties are free to choose between offensive and defensive force structures given the DEH were true..First, it is assumed that both parties know each other’s intentions — expressed by the payoffs of the antagonists. Thereafter, it is assumed that one party knows about the other’s

洞穴 发表于 2025-3-30 22:37:59

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生气地 发表于 2025-3-31 04:34:42

Covering Spaces and Fibrations,es including the status quo which results if none of the three proposals is accepted. It is an interesting fact that the set of uniformly perfect equilibrium points depends crucially on cardinal utilities although they always imply the same cyclical majorities. Furthermore, the staus quo will only s
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查看完整版本: Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models IV; Social and Political Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Wirtschaftstheo