GREEN
发表于 2025-3-25 04:06:03
A. Brini,F. Regonati,A. G. B. Teoliselements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.
Aspiration
发表于 2025-3-25 11:02:24
Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game,elements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.
誓言
发表于 2025-3-25 15:15:27
On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion,is repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agents. This is, in a very crude and simple fashion, the message of the Folk Theorem.
确保
发表于 2025-3-25 18:01:10
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惰性女人
发表于 2025-3-25 20:16:31
Abdallah Assi,Margherita Barilequilibria leaves only stationary equilibria in supergames. . ask when subgame-perfection may not pay appropriate attention to whether the group wishes to deviate from plans made, that is, to renegotiate.
spinal-stenosis
发表于 2025-3-26 02:05:00
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predict
发表于 2025-3-26 05:24:13
Connectedness, Smooth and Simplerstad , Cox, Roberson and Smith ).
reserve
发表于 2025-3-26 09:28:36
A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game,rstad , Cox, Roberson and Smith ).
Feedback
发表于 2025-3-26 16:27:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07365-0Evolution; Spieltheorie; Wirtschaftstheorie; algebra; economics; equilibrium; evolutionary processes; evolu
600
发表于 2025-3-26 19:37:14
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