HIKE
发表于 2025-3-25 04:24:45
Hao Dong,Zihan Ding,Shanghang Zhang state of the system and discloses information to a controller that can have friendly or adversarial intentions. We show that sensor outputs that are memoryless and linear in the state of the system can be optimal, in the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium, within the general class of
流行
发表于 2025-3-25 09:48:33
Anmol Jha,M. S. Abirami,Vishal Kumarrences at the start of the game and willingness to concede these preferences over time. We provide simulations highlighting specific insights on global and local influence, short-term interactions and the effects of homophily on consensus.
Ambulatory
发表于 2025-3-25 12:52:15
Mounika Addanki,Saraswathi Selvarajan be seen as a decision about timing: to determine . to disclose. In this paper, we present a model that shows how the criteria could be combined to determine the optimal time for the government to disclose a vulnerability, with the aim of providing insight into how a more formal, repeatable decision
饮料
发表于 2025-3-25 16:42:39
Raja Bhargava,N. Arivazhagan,K. Sureshbabu Furthermore, we provide greedy heuristics to approximately compute an equilibrium of these botnet defense games. Finally, we conduct experiments based on both synthetic and real-world network topologies to demonstrate advantages of our game-theoretic solution compared to previously proposed defense
军械库
发表于 2025-3-25 21:08:24
Conference proceedings 2017or security and privacy in cloud computing and for critical infrastructure; Security and privacy of wireless and mobile communications, including user location privacy; Game theory for intrusion detection; and Empirical and experimental studies with game-theoretic or optimization analysis for securi
Cubicle
发表于 2025-3-26 02:19:20
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联想记忆
发表于 2025-3-26 05:11:40
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未完成
发表于 2025-3-26 09:41:17
Incentive Compatibility of Pay Per Last , Shares in Bitcoin Mining Pools deteriorate with inside-pool inequality. In pools where all players have comparable computational power incentives to deviate from protocol are minor, but gains may be considerable in pools where miner’s resources are unequal. We explore how our findings can be applied to ameliorate delay attacks by fitting real-world parameters to our model.
HUMP
发表于 2025-3-26 15:14:59
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exigent
发表于 2025-3-26 17:19:24
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