buoyant
发表于 2025-3-23 12:35:50
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infatuation
发表于 2025-3-23 15:23:19
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蹒跚
发表于 2025-3-23 18:21:01
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Conquest
发表于 2025-3-23 22:58:40
An Ultimatum Game Model for the Evolution of Privacy in Jointly Managed Contentrences at the start of the game and willingness to concede these preferences over time. We provide simulations highlighting specific insights on global and local influence, short-term interactions and the effects of homophily on consensus.
漂泊
发表于 2025-3-24 02:21:24
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突袭
发表于 2025-3-24 09:12:06
A Stackelberg Game Model for Botnet Data Exfiltration Furthermore, we provide greedy heuristics to approximately compute an equilibrium of these botnet defense games. Finally, we conduct experiments based on both synthetic and real-world network topologies to demonstrate advantages of our game-theoretic solution compared to previously proposed defense
Maximizer
发表于 2025-3-24 13:35:12
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terazosin
发表于 2025-3-24 16:56:50
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彻底明白
发表于 2025-3-24 21:39:18
Integrating Learning and Planningcheme, and (ii) maximizing the collected fine, which we show to be strongly NP-hard. We also give a paramterized bound on the worst-case ratio of the intruders best adaptive strategy to the best non-adaptive strategy, i.e., when she fixes the complete route at the start.
SIT
发表于 2025-3-25 02:05:33
Combine Deep ,-Networks with Actor-Critic under some network setup, there exists a threshold power for which the actual gameplay of the legitimate nodes does not depend upon the actions of the jamming node, and vice versa. This allows us to choose the appropriate power allocation schemes given the total power and the action of the jamming