EPT
发表于 2025-3-26 21:34:23
Bassam Haddad,Klaus-Peter Adlassnigvice, and we use the recently proposed . game to model the struggle between the defender and attacker for control of the cloud. Because attacks upon the cloud can occur without knowledge of the defender, we assume that strategies in both games are picked according to prior commitment. This framework
吞下
发表于 2025-3-27 02:42:17
0302-9743 various fields such as economic, social and behavioural sciences, game and decision theory is playing a fundamental role in the development of the pillars of the "science of security"...978-3-319-25593-4978-3-319-25594-1Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
reception
发表于 2025-3-27 05:54:20
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阶层
发表于 2025-3-27 12:41:23
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NATTY
发表于 2025-3-27 15:18:48
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65661-4 (number of resources and the threshold) so as to ensure that it makes no sense for a rational adversary to try to attack the system. This selection is made on the basis of the relative costs of the attacker and the defender.
愉快吗
发表于 2025-3-27 18:57:45
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HILAR
发表于 2025-3-27 22:19:11
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liposuction
发表于 2025-3-28 03:26:54
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Relinquish
发表于 2025-3-28 08:12:58
Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Informationactly represented by attack graphs. Computing an exact Stackelberg Equilibrium using standard mixed-integer linear programming has a limited scalability in this game. We propose a set of approximate solution methods and analyze the trade-off between the computation time and the quality of the strategies calculated.
negligence
发表于 2025-3-28 12:18:27
Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All (number of resources and the threshold) so as to ensure that it makes no sense for a rational adversary to try to attack the system. This selection is made on the basis of the relative costs of the attacker and the defender.