noxious
发表于 2025-3-23 10:31:02
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Terminal
发表于 2025-3-23 16:49:48
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澄清
发表于 2025-3-23 19:43:29
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nonsensical
发表于 2025-3-23 22:35:25
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Indent
发表于 2025-3-24 03:51:07
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Constant
发表于 2025-3-24 07:33:18
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冷淡周边
发表于 2025-3-24 11:14:51
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肉身
发表于 2025-3-24 16:13:28
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Entreaty
发表于 2025-3-24 21:23:41
A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resourcesudy the Nash Equilibria of the game. We further study a sequential game where the defender first announces its strategy and the attacker then responds accordingly, and design an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal strategy for the defender to commit to.
inclusive
发表于 2025-3-25 02:21:04
Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Gamesended by any other agent. We analyze this strategy via a passivity-based approach and formulate sufficient conditions for the probability distribution of the set of defended targets to converge to a Stackelberg equilibrium. We then derive bounds on the deviation between the utility of the system pri