大火
发表于 2025-3-28 17:51:54
Concluding remarks on irreducibility,We conclude with brief remarks about the evidence that the reduced games obtained in Sections 8 and 9 are not further reducible. (Those in Sections 10 and 11 clearly are not.)
内向者
发表于 2025-3-28 20:14:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95663-8Bidding/Spending Models; Noncooperative Game Theory; Optimierungstheorie; Optimization Theory; Silverman
bourgeois
发表于 2025-3-29 01:26:22
978-3-540-54372-5Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991
巨头
发表于 2025-3-29 04:36:31
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laparoscopy
发表于 2025-3-29 07:50:10
Edward I. Altman Ph.D.,James La Fleurd the penalty ν > 0. Players I and II choose numbers independently from S. and S., respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses ν. If the numbers are equal the payoff is zero.
Munificent
发表于 2025-3-29 11:53:56
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Instrumental
发表于 2025-3-29 18:35:38
Reifegradmodell des Sicherheitsmanagements, W͂. and W͂. are already the essential sets. The nine diagonals and the solutions of the corresponding 3 by 3 games are given below. We abbreviate the diagonal elements -1 and +1 by - and +, respectively. P = (p., p.,p.) is the optimal strategy for Player I, Q = (q.,q.,q.) that for Player II. V is the game value.