放逐某人
发表于 2025-3-25 05:50:36
Edward I. Altman Ph.D.,James La Fleurd the penalty ν > 0. Players I and II choose numbers independently from S. and S., respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses ν. If the numbers are equal the payoff is zero.
纪念
发表于 2025-3-25 11:01:53
,Kurzfassung und Überblick für Eilige,games, in the sense that each player has a 2-component optimal mixed strategy. In this section we shall identify all irreducible 2 by 2 Silverman games, and in the next section are some theorems giving conditions under which games reduce to 2 by 2. “Game” hereafter will always mean “Silverman game.”
receptors
发表于 2025-3-25 13:50:54
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inchoate
发表于 2025-3-25 19:06:41
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非实体
发表于 2025-3-25 20:42:01
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Antimicrobial
发表于 2025-3-26 00:54:09
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暂时中止
发表于 2025-3-26 06:18:30
Spezifische Sicherheitskonzepte,uced game, corresponding to (A), (B), (C) and (D) in (8.0.4). In our description of these, the first nonzero main-diagonal element is again always -1, and off-diagonal zeros are concentrated in a middle segment of the first subdiagonal. The remainder of th€ matrix is the same in all cases, and may b
Blatant
发表于 2025-3-26 11:41:30
https://doi.org/10.37307/b.978-3-503-21129-6the diagonal consists entirely of zeros in the symmetric case and entirely of ones in the disjoint case has the effect that the components in the optimal strategy vectors may be described by simple recursions. For nonconstant diagonals these relations among the components are less regular, but in a
违法事实
发表于 2025-3-26 14:53:05
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systemshttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/180447.jpg
合并
发表于 2025-3-26 16:59:45
Introduction,d the penalty ν > 0. Players I and II choose numbers independently from S. and S., respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses ν. If the numbers are equal the payoff is zero.