欺骗某人
发表于 2025-3-21 16:35:57
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extinct
发表于 2025-3-21 23:53:29
Further Results on Capacitated Network Design Games, and this bound is tight. Furthermore, we show that the price of stability for asymmetric games can be ., matching the previously known upper bound. We also prove that the convergence time of best response dynamics cannot be bounded by any function of ..
偏离
发表于 2025-3-22 00:55:32
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OCTO
发表于 2025-3-22 08:00:21
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修饰
发表于 2025-3-22 09:15:09
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Fortuitous
发表于 2025-3-22 12:58:54
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缺乏
发表于 2025-3-22 20:43:25
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过分自信
发表于 2025-3-22 21:24:35
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MAOIS
发表于 2025-3-23 03:46:53
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售穴
发表于 2025-3-23 07:43:24
Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Tiesess only for certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our mechanism; we show that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is prone to strategic manipulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case (with or without ties), for which truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do exist.