Aerate
发表于 2025-3-30 10:26:02
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寒冷
发表于 2025-3-30 15:56:08
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37623-9on-cost. Games with unit-cost machines are potential games, and every instance has an optimal solution which is also a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). On the other hand, with arbitrary-cost machines, a PNE is guaranteed to exist only for very limited instances, and the price of stability is linear in t
incision
发表于 2025-3-30 19:06:17
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Obscure
发表于 2025-3-31 00:36:52
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Autobiography
发表于 2025-3-31 04:44:19
Thomas Cattoi,David M. Odorisions for many buyers, again in the context of a revenue target. For ., we provide a FPTAS to compute the optimal posted prices for a given sequence of buyers. For ., we apply the results of [.] on sparse covers of distributions to obtain a PTAS in a setting where the seller has a constraint on discrim