突袭
发表于 2025-3-25 05:36:18
,A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem,e VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.
仔细检查
发表于 2025-3-25 11:19:45
http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152941/152941_22.png
tinnitus
发表于 2025-3-25 12:51:10
978-3-642-04644-5Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
完成才会征服
发表于 2025-3-25 18:29:48
Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-642-04645-2Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
枪支
发表于 2025-3-25 21:16:38
M. Wolfersdorf,AK-Depressionsstationene VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.
群居男女
发表于 2025-3-26 00:49:21
Monotonicity in Mechanism Design, buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism, which implements this allocation rule. The domain is a weak monotonicity domain if every deterministi
Overdose
发表于 2025-3-26 07:05:12
http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1530/152941/152941_27.png
渐强
发表于 2025-3-26 08:56:13
,A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem,e VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.
GROG
发表于 2025-3-26 13:21:11
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations,arbitrary, valuations for outcomes are convex functions in the type, and utilities over outcomes and payments are quasi-linear. Archer and Kleinberg have proven that in case of valuation functions that are linear in the type monotonicity in combination with a local integrability condition are eq
阴谋
发表于 2025-3-26 20:36:04
Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents, the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs proportional to the usage of her edge. Moreover, we consider a mechanism design setting with ., which generalizes the well-known setting of one-parameter agents by allowing a fixed cost component