gentle
发表于 2025-3-25 05:09:21
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FELON
发表于 2025-3-25 08:18:08
Kerstin Stolzenberg,Krischan Heberlefined in a characteristic function form. In order to allow coalitions to evolve, we embed them in the set of fuzzy coalitions. Hence, we define the dynamic core as a set-valued map associating with each fuzzy coalition and each time the set of allotments is such that their payoffs at that time to th
神圣将军
发表于 2025-3-25 14:23:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78855-3ased on it are introduced. The new concept of “imputation distribution procedure” (IDP) is defined and connected with the basic definitions of time-consistency and strong time-consistency. Sufficient conditions of the existence of time-consistent solutions are derived. For a large class of games whe
知道
发表于 2025-3-25 17:38:45
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ABHOR
发表于 2025-3-25 21:10:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62187-5 stage. When the chain is stopped the game terminates and Player 1 receives from Player 2 a sum depending on the player who stopped the chain and on its current state. If the game continues infinitely, then Player 1 gets “the payoff at infinity” depending on the “limiting” behavior of the chain traj
抓住他投降
发表于 2025-3-26 03:39:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62187-5jects) from a known continuous distribution appearing according to some renewal process with the object of choosing the largest one. The horizon of observation is a positive random variable independent of objects. The observation of the random variables is imperfect and the players are informed only
Bureaucracy
发表于 2025-3-26 06:10:35
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62187-5erview list. The applicants come in random order and their salary demands are distinct. Two managers, I and II, interview them one at a time. The aim of the manager is to obtain the applicant who demands minimal salary. When both managers want to accept the same candidate, then some rule of assignme
CANON
发表于 2025-3-26 10:58:39
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osteopath
发表于 2025-3-26 16:03:41
Auslöser von UnternehmenswandelWe discuss the risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium concept in static non-cooperative games and two-stage stochastic games of resource extraction. Two equilibrium theorems are established for the latter class of games. Provided examples explain the meaning of risk-sensitive equilibria in games with random moves.
打包
发表于 2025-3-26 19:53:02
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