hypnogram
发表于 2025-3-25 03:55:27
,Ipseity’s Ownness and Uniqueness, and personal style. Following especially Erich Klawonn we hold the answer to the question of whether what “I” refers to may have an ontological clone to be different in the first-person and third-person. All this is connected to the question of how the transcendental “pure” I is the same and differs from “the myself.”
讥讽
发表于 2025-3-25 07:49:57
Ontology and Meontology of I-ness, an individual essence or haecceity, and the thesis that there is a coincidence of the bare particular substrate I and the concretum or eidetic singularity (definite description). If we take numerical identity to mean that it is meaningful to say that something is not two, then what “I” refers to is . a numerical identity (Hönigswald).
Nomadic
发表于 2025-3-25 12:45:37
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固执点好
发表于 2025-3-25 16:39:37
The First Person and the Transcendental I, self-awareness is non-reflective and always pervaded by an at least anonymous I-ness. We address opponents such as Humeans, Buddhists and even Castañeda. Inseparable from this discussion is the analysis of what a “perspective” is, what “first-person perspective” means, and the relation of reflection to first-person perspective.
HERTZ
发表于 2025-3-25 23:17:24
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借喻
发表于 2025-3-26 00:55:43
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使成波状
发表于 2025-3-26 05:07:11
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共同时代
发表于 2025-3-26 12:18:03
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Conducive
发表于 2025-3-26 16:06:19
The Afterlife and the Transcendental I, basic distinction between the non-criterial/non-identifiable identity of one’s unique essence and one’s personal identity. We side with the view that all senses of identity of the self are not to be tied to memory. We discuss the difficulties for phenomenology raised by Shoemaker’s theory of “quasi
bibliophile
发表于 2025-3-26 19:11:05
Book 2009iptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties...Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the “transcendental person”. For example, we contend with the unpresentabi