Mechanics
发表于 2025-3-25 05:39:08
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Parameter
发表于 2025-3-25 10:18:34
Stable Dinner Party Seating Arrangementsevious hardness results if preferences are allowed to be asymmetric. For stability, it is known that deciding the existence of stable arrangements is NP-hard for both topologies, but only if sufficiently-many numerical values are allowed. As it turns out, even constructing unstable instances can be
Ancillary
发表于 2025-3-25 15:16:59
Stable Dinner Party Seating Arrangementsevious hardness results if preferences are allowed to be asymmetric. For stability, it is known that deciding the existence of stable arrangements is NP-hard for both topologies, but only if sufficiently-many numerical values are allowed. As it turns out, even constructing unstable instances can be
做事过头
发表于 2025-3-25 15:54:48
Buy-Many Mechanisms for Many Unit-Demand Buyersm pricing mechanism with buyer-specific prices can achieve an . approximation to this revenue benchmark when all buyers have unit-demand or additive preferences over m items. This is the best possible as it directly matches the previous results for the single-buyer setting where no simple mechanism
incubus
发表于 2025-3-25 22:11:49
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欢腾
发表于 2025-3-26 01:12:15
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divd assumption of being able to afford each agent entirely, we are able to circumvent such results. We design a polynomial-time, deterministic, truthful, budget-feasible, .-approximation mechanism for the setting where each agent offers multiple levels of service and the auctioneer has a discrete sepa
杀人
发表于 2025-3-26 07:22:51
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divd assumption of being able to afford each agent entirely, we are able to circumvent such results. We design a polynomial-time, deterministic, truthful, budget-feasible, .-approximation mechanism for the setting where each agent offers multiple levels of service and the auctioneer has a discrete sepa
Coronary
发表于 2025-3-26 10:00:47
Fair Division with Allocator’s Preferenceoth the agents’ and the allocator’s perspectives, in which such an allocation is called . or . respectively. When the allocator’s utility depends exclusively on the items (but not to whom an item is allocated), we prove that a doubly EF-1 allocation always exists. For the general setting where the a
他很灵活
发表于 2025-3-26 14:15:42
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Ambulatory
发表于 2025-3-26 18:34:18
Fair Division with Allocator’s Preferenceoth the agents’ and the allocator’s perspectives, in which such an allocation is called . or . respectively. When the allocator’s utility depends exclusively on the items (but not to whom an item is allocated), we prove that a doubly EF-1 allocation always exists. For the general setting where the a