流浪
发表于 2025-3-26 21:23:23
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matchingces even though they have an edge available..As our main result, we introduce an algorithm which randomly discards some edges of the graph in a particular manner – thus enabling the necessary skipping of vertices – and simultaneously runs the color-oblivious algorithm .. We prove that this algorithm
散步
发表于 2025-3-27 02:51:30
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgetsm that returns an (1 − .)-approximation of the revenue obtained by any envy-free fixed-price mechanism for any . > 0 and runs in polynomial time in the number of bidders . and 1/ . even for exponential supply of goods .. Next, we consider the case of budgeted bidders with matching-type preferences o
秘密会议
发表于 2025-3-27 07:51:31
Argyrios Deligkas,John Fearnley,Rahul Savani,Paul Spirakis
forbid
发表于 2025-3-27 09:44:20
Smriti Bhagat,Anthony Kim,S. Muthukrishnan,Udi Weinsberg
付出
发表于 2025-3-27 14:39:11
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021689/1021689_35.png
石墨
发表于 2025-3-27 21:51:33
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021689/1021689_36.png
宇宙你
发表于 2025-3-27 23:17:46
Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria-increasing utility functions..We show that the value of the potential function Φ(.) of any outcome . of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value Φ(..) by a factor . which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions ., and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the t
我吃花盘旋
发表于 2025-3-28 05:20:19
Limiting Price Discrimination when Selling Products with Positive Network Externalities the item. The goal of the seller is to maximize his revenue. Previous work on this problem studies the case where clients are offered the item in sequence and have to pay personalized prices. This is highly infeasible in large scale networks such as the Facebook graph: (1) Offering items to the
engender
发表于 2025-3-28 08:25:01
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021689/1021689_39.png
avulsion
发表于 2025-3-28 14:30:55
Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Gamesy (PoA). First, we prove that among all cost-sharing methods that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the Shapley value minimizes the worst-case PoA. Second, if the guaranteed existence condition is dropped, then the proportional cost-sharing method minimizes the worst-case PoA over all