生气的边缘
发表于 2025-3-28 15:10:01
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Frenetic
发表于 2025-3-28 21:45:17
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一致性
发表于 2025-3-29 01:19:37
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Blatant
发表于 2025-3-29 03:25:04
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时代
发表于 2025-3-29 07:32:17
ends to de-place place-health relationships by not explicitly engaging local/regional social, political, and economic practices/processes that fundamentally shape (socio)spatial distributions of health opportunities/risks. That is, this work frequently ignores the manners and mechanisms through whic
exclusice
发表于 2025-3-29 13:33:43
Jan-Gero Alexander Hannemann,Georg Dietleinng versions of content internalism, including David Chalmers.This book defends a novel view of mental representation—of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, bel
描绘
发表于 2025-3-29 18:33:30
Jan-Gero Alexander Hannemann,Georg Dietleinoblems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs—beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves—given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed t
纬度
发表于 2025-3-29 20:29:51
Jan-Gero Alexander Hannemann,Georg Dietlein knowing by way of ideas, that of neurophysiological materialism. So here is the question: What do contemporary neuroscientists or neurophilosophers take . to be? This question is a version of the seventeenth century question considered throughout this book: What is an idea? It is an ontological que
resilience
发表于 2025-3-30 01:23:10
Jan-Gero Alexander Hannemann,Georg Dietlein knowing by way of ideas, that of neurophysiological materialism. So here is the question: What do contemporary neuroscientists or neurophilosophers take . to be? This question is a version of the seventeenth century question considered throughout this book: What is an idea? It is an ontological que