最有利
发表于 2025-3-26 23:28:07
4 Control Costs, game, incurs costs depending on how well he chooses to control his actions. Such a game models the idea that a player can reduce the probability of making mistakes, but that he can only do so by being extra prudent, hence, by spending an extra effort, which involves some costs.. The goal of the cha
无能力
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narcissism
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包裹
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7 Bargaining and Fair Division,ow these gains should be divided. Although traditionally such problems belong to the realm of cooperative game theory, we will study them by non-cooperative methods. The objectives are twofold: ( 1 ) to show how concepts from cooperative game theory can be implemented by means of noncooperative meth
Amendment
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8 Repeated Games,ame perfect (or Nash ) equilibria when a game is repeated finitely or infinitely many times. The main result is the Perfect Folk Theorem, which states that, for almost all games, every outcome that is feasible and individually rational in the one-shot game can be approximated by subgame perfect equi
Substance
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9 Evolutionary Game Theory,ng the intended fields of application. Since the theory is based on an idealized picture of human rationality, it is by no means obvious that it can be applied to situations in which the players cannot be attributed any intellectual capabilities. However, in their seminal paper ‘The logic of animal
过渡时期
发表于 2025-3-27 23:50:57
7 Bargaining and Fair Division,rative methods. The objectives are twofold: ( 1 ) to show how concepts from cooperative game theory can be implemented by means of noncooperative methods and ( 2 ) to illustrate the strength of the subgame perfectness concept ( and the weakness of the Nash equilibrium concept ) in dynamic games with perfect information.
DRILL
发表于 2025-3-28 03:44:42
4 Control Costs,pter is to investigate what the consequences are of viewing an ordinary normal form game as a limiting case of a game with control costs, i.e. it is examined which equilibria are still viable when infinitesimal control costs are incorporated into the analysis of normal form games.
Pulmonary-Veins
发表于 2025-3-28 08:46:11
5 Incomplete Information, is more realistic to assume that each player always has some slight uncertainty about the payoffs of his opponents rather than to assume that he knows these payoffs exactly. Our objective in this chapter is to study what the consequences are of this more realistic point of view.
hurricane
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