Spinal-Tap
发表于 2025-3-25 05:10:48
Privacy-Preserving Fingerprint Authentication Resistant to Hill-Climbing Attacksentication schemes by generalizing the related and proposed schemes. As far as we know, the proposed scheme is the first one that has been proved to satisfy all the properties. In particular, the proposed scheme achieves security under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
CLEFT
发表于 2025-3-25 09:30:45
Differential Forgery Attack Against LACrentials have a probability higher than ., which allows a forgery attack on the full LAC..This work illustrates the difference between the probability of differentials and characteristics, and we describe tools to evaluate the probability of some characteristics.
懒惰人民
发表于 2025-3-25 14:16:21
Key-Recovery Attacks Against the MAC Algorithm Chaskeyn the multi-user setting and we recover all keys of . users by doing . queries per user. Finally, we show a variant of this attack where we are able to recover keys of two users in a smaller group of . users.
Pedagogy
发表于 2025-3-25 17:37:55
0302-9743 structions; authenticated encryption; on the hardness ofmathematical problems; and cryptanalysis of authenticated encryption schemes..978-3-319-31300-9978-3-319-31301-6Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
dry-eye
发表于 2025-3-25 22:21:30
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Harness
发表于 2025-3-26 02:45:31
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vascular
发表于 2025-3-26 04:27:34
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高脚酒杯
发表于 2025-3-26 09:00:40
Sandy2x: New Curve25519 Speed Recordse cryptography using a vectorized multiplier on Sandy Bridge and Ivy Bridge. Our work suggests that the vectorized multiplier might be a better choice for elliptic-curve computation, or even other types ofcomputation that involve prime-field arithmetic, even in the case where the computation does not exhibit very nice internal parallelism.
DEFT
发表于 2025-3-26 12:52:09
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狼群
发表于 2025-3-26 19:11:03
Forgery and Subkey Recovery on CAESAR Candidate iFeedncryption. Furthermore, we show how at the price of just one additional forgery one can learn . for any freely chosen plaintext .. These design weaknesses allow one to decrypt earlier iFeed encryptions under the respective nonces, breaking the forward secrecy of iFeed, and leading to a total security compromise of the iFeed design.