HACK
发表于 2025-3-25 07:19:20
Relations Among Security Notions for Undeniable Signature Schemesem. We focus on two adversarial goals which are unforgeability and invisibility and two attacks which are chosen message attack and full attack. In particular,we show that unforgeability against chosen message attack is equivalent to unforgeability against full attack, and invisibility against chose
Defraud
发表于 2025-3-25 07:39:59
Concurrent Blind Signatures Without Random Oracles short communication. The scheme is based on elliptic curve groups for which a bilinear map exists and on extractable and equivocal commitments. The unforgeability of the employed signature scheme is guaranteed by the LRSW assumption while the blindness property of our scheme is guaranteed by the De
陪审团
发表于 2025-3-25 12:33:09
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delegate
发表于 2025-3-25 18:40:00
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Solace
发表于 2025-3-25 21:36:02
Related-Key Attacks on the Full-Round Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64bhich consist of 16 and 20 rounds, respectively. In this paper, we investigate their security against related-key attacks. Our investigation shows that the full 16-round Cobra-F64a can be broken by our related-key rectangle attack and that the full 20-round Cobra-F64b can be broken by our related-key
厌食症
发表于 2025-3-26 01:13:11
Constant-Size Dynamic ,-TAAr of times. Dynamic .-TAA allows application providers to independently grant or revoke users from their own access group so as to provide better control over their clients. In terms of time and space complexity, existing dynamic .-TAA schemes are of complexities O(.), where . is the allowed number
繁荣中国
发表于 2025-3-26 06:32:31
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Guileless
发表于 2025-3-26 11:07:02
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边缘带来墨水
发表于 2025-3-26 15:47:34
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搜集
发表于 2025-3-26 20:08:12
A New Key Exchange Protocol Based on MQV Assuming Public Computationsved secure in these models. However, models currently used assume that a honest entity involved in a key exchange is trusted as a whole. In many practical contexts, the entity is divided in an . storing a private key and having low computing power, and a ., that performs part of the computations req